This paper proposes a hierarchy of three Byzantine-resistant protocols aimed to be used in practical distributed systems: multi-valued consensus, vector consensus and atomic broadcast. These protocols are designed as successive transformations from one to another. The first protocol, multi-valued consensus, is implemented on top of a randomized binary consensus. The protocols share a set of important structural properties. Firstly, they do not use signatures obtained with public-key cryptography, a well-known performance bottleneck in this kind of protocols. Secondly, they are time-free, i.e., they make no synchrony assumptions, since these assumptions are often vulnerable to subtle but effective attacks. Thirdly, they have no leaders, thus avoiding the cost of detecting corrupt processes. Fourthly, they have optimal resilience, i.e., they tolerate f = n−1 3 out of a total of n processes. The multi-valued consensus protocol terminates in a constant expected number of rounds, while the vector consensus and atomic broadcast protocols have time complexities O(f ).
Introduction
Distributed protocols capable of tolerating Byzantine faults have been being studied for more than two decades [25, 21, 27, 2] . Recently, interest in these protocols has gained a new momentum under the designation of intrusion tolerance [33] . The basic idea is that the security concepts of attack, intrusion and vulnerability can be considered as faults, more precisely as arbitrary faults, also called Byzantine faults 1 . A consequence of this assertion is that Byzantine-resistant protocols can be important building blocks for the construction of secure systems.
Byzantine-resistant (or intrusion-tolerant) protocols usually have higher time and message complexities than crash-tolerant protocols do. They are also more CPU-time demanding since they must use cryptography, and often public-key cryptography. This CPU-time issue is frequently dismissed since the processing power of computers is constantly increasing. However, new classes of computing environments are appearing in which resources are scarce, e.g., embedded and ubiquitous computing. This is an important motivation for the design of less CPU-time consuming intrusion-tolerant protocols. Moreover, public-key cryptography operations can be an important bottleneck for the performance of intrusion-tolerant systems even in more powerful hardware.
Castro and Liskov designed an intrusion-tolerant NFS system which performs on average only 3% slower than standard NFS, in part due to avoiding the use of signatures based on public-key cryptography [9] .
A central argument of this paper is that the design of efficient Byzantine-resistant protocols is crucial for the implementation of practical intrusion-tolerant systems, therefore these protocols have to avoid as much as possible the use of public-key cryptography. Moreover, practical intrusion-tolerant systems require protocols with other characteristics, like strict asynchrony, optimal resilience, and low time complexity. The paper provides a coherent family of protocols with these properties.
Paper Results. The paper presents a hierarchy of three Byzantine-resistant protocols: multi-valued consensus, vector consensus and atomic broadcast (see Figure 1 ). Consensus is a distributed systems problem with both theoretical and practical interest. The problem can be stated this way: how does a set of distributed processes achieve agreement on a value despite a number of process failures? The paper implements two flavors of consensus: multi-valued consensus that makes agreement on values with an arbitrary size; and vector consensus that makes agreement on a vector with the values proposed by several of the processes. An atomic broadcast protocol is a communication protocol that delivers the same messages to all processes and in the same order.
Atomic broadcast is, for instance, the main component of fault-tolerant systems based on the state-machine approach, with both crash [29] and Byzantine faults [9] . Atomic broadcast has been shown to be equivalent to multi-valued consensus in systems prone to crash faults [19] . The problem of consensus has been studied with different system models, such as the synchronous and the asynchronous time models, and with distinct types of failures, from crash to arbitrary. In asynchronous systems, consensus has been shown to be constrained by the FLP impossibility result, which says that it is impossible to solve consensus deterministically in a completely asynchronous system [17] . Consequently, various researchers have proposed ways to circumvent this limitation: using randomization [27, 2, 4, 30, 5, 8, 7] , making synchrony or timing assumptions on the behavior of the system [14, 16, 32] , using failure detectors [10, 28, 13, 1, 12] or ordering oracles [26] , using wormholes [11] , or imposing conditions on inputs [24] .
The protocols in the paper do not solve consensus from scratch but are built on top of a randomized binary consensus protocol (e.g., [4, 8] ). They also require a reliable broadcast protocol (e.g., [5] ). The three protocols share the following set of structural properties:
• Signature free. The protocols do not use signatures based on public-key cryptography.
• Asynchrony. The protocols are asynchronous, there are no synchrony assumptions whatsoever.
• Distribution. Decisions are taken in a distributed way, i.e., there are no coordinators, leaders or tokenholders.
• Optimal resilience. The protocols tolerate f = n− 1 3 faulty processes out of a total of n processes.
A hierarchy of protocols with this combination of characteristics is novel, to the best of our knowledge.
Furthermore, these properties are provided coherently by all the protocols in the hierarchy. We argue that all of them are important if the protocols are to be used in practice. The argument for avoiding public-key cryptography (first property) has already been done above, so let us discuss the importance of the other three properties.
Many protocols in the literature are designated "asynchronous" but make synchrony assumptions, either explicitly [14, 16, 32] or contained in the unreliable failure detector abstraction [28, 13, 1, 12] . These assumptions can make the protocols vulnerable to subtle but effective attacks in the domain of time, something that cannot happen in time-free systems. Some discussion about this kind of attacks and the corresponding vulnerabilities can be found in [9, 7] . Our protocols are time-free or strictly asynchronous (second property) but circumvent FLP by being built on top of a randomized binary consensus protocol. Although randomized, the probability of termination of this protocol gets close to 1 'fast' with the number of message exchange rounds.
The third property -distribution -is important because it eludes the need for detecting faulty coordinators, leaders or token-holders. This detection usually has a price in terms of time and messages transmitted. Moreover, even a common failure like a process crash cannot be detected in a strictly asynchronous system, since there are no bounds on the communication delays.
The resilience of a protocol can be defined as the maximum number of faults in the presence of which the protocol still behaves according to its specification. The optimal resilience for asynchronous consensus has been shown to be n−1 3 [5] . Atomic broadcast is an equivalent problem, so the optimal resilience is the same [19] . Optimal resilience is an important property because the need for additional processes to tolerate the same number of faults involves a cost in terms of additional resources (e.g., additional hardware).
The evaluation of a distributed protocol is usually made in terms of time and message complexities. Time complexity is usually considered more important, so we evaluate the protocols in terms of this criterion. In asynchronous systems, time complexity is usually measured in terms of maximum number of asynchronous rounds. An asynchronous round involves a process sending a message and receiving one or more messages sent in response to the former. For randomized protocols, the metric is usually the expected number of asynchronous rounds. Our multi-valued consensus protocol has time complexity O(1), i.e., it has a constant expected number of rounds. The complexities of the vector consensus and the atomic broadcast protocols are both O(f ). These complexities are at least as good as previous works, except for one vector consensus that manages to have time complexity O(1) at the cost of a higher message complexity [3] .
Paper organization. The paper is organized as follows. The following section defines the system model and the two components used by our protocols: reliable broadcast and binary consensus. Section 3 presents our multi-valued consensus protocol and proves its correctness. Sections 4 and 5 present, respectively, the vector consensus and atomic broadcast protocols. Section 6 assesses the performance of the protocols. Section 7 discusses some related work and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Definitions

System Model
The system is composed by a set of n processes P = {p 1 , p 2 , ...p n }. A process is said to be correct if it does not fail during the execution of the protocol, i.e., if it follows the protocol. We assume that at most
processes can fail and we call these processes corrupt. These failures can be Byzantine, meaning that processes can stop, omit messages, send incorrect messages, send several messages with the same identifier, etc. Additionally, corrupt processes can pursue their goal of breaking the properties of the protocol alone or in collusion with other corrupt processes.
Processes are fully-connected by reliable channels with two properties: if the sender and the recipient of a message are both correct then (1) the message is eventually received and (2) the message is not modified in the channel. In practice, these properties have to be obtained with retransmissions and using cryptography.
The channels are assumed to be fair, i.e., if a message is sent infinitely often by a process, then it is received infinitely often by its recipient. Message authentication codes (MACs) are cryptographic checksums that serve our purpose, and only use symmetric cryptography [22] 2 .
The system is asynchronous, which means that there are no clocks, no bounds on the processing times and on the communication delays.
Reliable Broadcast
A reliable broadcast protocol ensures essentially that all correct processes deliver the same messages, and that messages broadcasted by correct processes are delivered. Moreover, it ensures that no two different messages with the same identifier are delivered. This identifier includes the typical information in a protocol header:
protocol type, sender, broadcast channel, and sequence number. An example of an asynchronous Byzantineresistant reliable broadcast protocol is the one proposed by Bracha and Toueg [5] . We consider that the reliable 2 The processes have to share symmetric keys in order to use MACs. In the paper we assume these keys are distributed before the protocol is executed. In practice, this can be solved using key distribution protocols available in the literature. This issue is out of the scope of the present paper.
broadcast is executed by calling the function R Broadcast(M ) (see, e.g., Algorithm 1 below).
Formally, a reliable broadcast protocol can be defined in terms of the following properties [19, 6] :
• RB1 Validity: If a correct process broadcasts a message M, then some correct process eventually delivers M.
• RB2 Agreement: If a correct process delivers a message M, then all correct processes eventually deliver M.
• RB3 Integrity: For any identifier ID, every correct process p delivers at most one message M with identifier ID, and if sender(M) is correct then M was previously broadcast by sender(M).
The predicate sender(M) gives the field of the message header that identifies its sender. Note that we consider that the sender also delivers the messages it broadcasts.
Binary Consensus
A binary consensus protocol performs consensus on a binary value b ∈ {0, 1}. The problem can be formally defined in terms of three properties:
• BC1 Validity: If all correct processes propose the same value b, then any correct process that decides, decides b.
• BC2 Agreement: No two correct processes decide differently.
• BC3 Termination: Every correct process eventually decides.
Besides satisfying this definition, the binary consensus protocol to be used in the hierarchy has to be compatible with the structural properties given in the introduction: it cannot use public-key signatures, has to be asynchronous, has to take decisions in a distributed way and has to have optimal resilience. Examples of protocols that satisfy these requirements are [4, 8] .
We consider that the binary consensus protocol is executed by calling the function B Consensus(b, bcid),
where b is the binary value proposed and bcid the protocol execution identifier.
Multi-Valued Consensus
The first protocol of the hierarchy proposed in the paper is a multi-valued consensus. The definition of the problem is similar to the binary consensus, except that processes can propose values with arbitrary length v ∈ V (V is the domain of values that can be proposed). The protocol can decide one of the values proposed or a default value ⊥ / ∈ V, in case the correct processes did not propose the same value. The definition is:
• MVC1 Validity 1. If all correct processes propose the same value v, then any correct process that decides, decides v.
• MVC2 Validity 2. If a correct process decides v, then v was proposed by some process or v = ⊥.
• MVC3 Validity 3. If a value v is proposed only by corrupt processes, then no correct process that decides, decides v.
• MVC4 Agreement. No two correct processes decide differently.
• MVC5 Termination. Every correct process eventually decides.
The problem of multi-valued consensus is usually stated in terms of the properties MVC1, MVC2, MVC4
and MVC5 above. We strengthen this definition with property MVC3 that states that the protocol does not decide values proposed only by corrupt processes. In practice, this property is satisfied by not deciding on a value if only f or less processes proposed it. This property is a requirement of the vector consensus protocol, implemented on top of the multi-valued consensus. However, the reader should notice that some consensus protocols in the literature have this property, even if they do not state it explicitly. For instance, binary consensus protocols that guarantee MVC1 also satisfy MVC3: if v is proposed only by corrupt processes, then all correct processes proposed not v.
The Protocol
The protocol is presented in Algorithm 1. 
Otherwise, it selects the default value ⊥, which it also broadcasts. After broadcasting this message (VECT), the process waits for (n − f ) valid VECT messages, i.e., messages known to have a vector with real proposals and a value substantiated by those proposals. The identifier of a message VECT includes the protocol type (VECT), the the consensus identifier (cid) and the sender (i).
Definition 1 A message VECT, w j , V j , cid, j is said to be valid iff:
If the process does not receive two VECT messages with different values w = w , and it receives at least (n − 2f ) messages with w, it proposes 1 for the binary consensus, otherwise it proposes 0 (lines [13] [14] [15] [16] . If the binary consensus decides 0, the vector consensus protocol decides on the default value ⊥ (lines [17] [18] [19] . If the binary consensus decides 1, the process waits for (n − 2f ) valid VECT messages with the same value w (line 20), in case it had not received them yet, and delivers this value (line 21). Notice that line 20 does not wait for (n − 2f ) messages but rather until it received cumulatively from the beginning (n − 2f ) VECT messages with the same value w.
Correctness Proof
The protocol in Algorithm 1 is correct if it satisfies properties MVC1 to MVC5. A preliminary result is given by the following lemma: 
Vector Consensus
Vector consensus makes agreement on a vector with a subset of the proposed values, instead of a single value [13] . In systems where Byzantine faults can occur, the vector is useful only if a majority of its values were proposed by correct processes. Therefore, the decided vector needs to have at least (2f + 1) values.
This problem is ultimately an adaptation for asynchronous systems of the classical problem of interactive consistency defined for synchronous systems [25] . The difference between the two problems is that interactive consistency makes agreement on a vector with the values proposed by all correct processes, while vector consensus guarantees only that the majority of the values were proposed by correct processes. The reason for this difference is that in asynchronous systems it is not possible to ensure that the vector has the proposals of all correct processes, since they can be arbitrarily delayed.
Vector consensus can be defined in terms of the following properties:
• VC1 Vector validity: Every correct process that decides, decides on a vector v of size n:
then either V[i] is the value proposed by p i or ⊥;
-at least (f + 1) elements of V were proposed by correct processes.
• VC2 Agreement: No two correct processes decide differently.
• VC3 Termination: Every correct process eventually decides.
The Protocol
The protocol is implemented by the function Vector Consensus presented in Algorithm 2. The arguments are the value proposed (v i ) and the vector consensus identifier (vcid). The protocol starts by reliably broadcasting a VC INIT message with the value proposed by the process (line 2). This message is identified by the protocol type (VC INIT), the vector consensus identifier (vcid) and the sender (i). Then, the protocol runs one or more rounds until a decision is made (lines 3-8).
The algorithm begins each round by waiting for the reception of (2f + 1 + r i ) VC INIT messages (line 4).
Notice that line 4 does not restart from scratch waiting for the (2f + 1 + r i ) messages, but rather waits until that number of messages has cumulatively been received since the beginning. Next, the process builds a vector 
Correctness Proof
The protocol in Algorithm 2 is correct if it satisfies the properties VC1, VC2 and VC3. 
Theorem 6 (Vector validity) Every correct process that decides, decides on a vector
Atomic Broadcast
The problem of atomic broadcast, or total order reliable broadcast, is the problem of delivering the same messages in the same order to all processes. The definition of the problem is equal to the definition of reliable broadcast plus a total order property:
• AB1 Validity: If a correct process broadcasts a message M, then some correct process eventually delivers M.
• AB2 Agreement: If a correct process delivers a message M, then all correct processes eventually deliver M.
• AB3 Integrity: For any identifier ID, every correct process p delivers at most one message M with identifier ID, and if sender(M) is correct then M was previously broadcast by sender(M).
• AB4 Total order: If two correct processes deliver two messages M 1 and M 2 then both processes deliver the two messages in the same order.
The identifier of an atomic broadcast message includes the protocol type (A MSG), the message number (num) and the sender identifier (i).
The atomic broadcast protocol is implemented on top of the vector consensus protocol. It could also be implemented directly on top of the multi-valued consensus but, in the end, the functionality of the vector consensus protocol would have to be implemented in the protocol anyway. The approach we use is more modular and elegant, besides providing the two protocols, either of which may be useful for the system designer.
The Protocol
The protocol is presented in Algorithm 3. The initialization is carried out before the first transmission or reception of a message (lines 1-4). A process atomically broadcasts a message by calling the function A Broadcast, which simply reliably broadcasts the message to all processes (lines 5-6). The message number num guarantees that all messages broadcasted by a correct process are unique, since this number is unique. If a malicious process tries to call R Broadcast twice with the same message, then the reliable broadcast protocol delivers the message only once (see property RB3, Integrity).
The delivery of messages is handled by tasks T1 and T2. When a message is delivered by the reliable broadcast protocol, it is inserted in the set R delivered i (lines [15] [16] . Whenever this set is not empty, the process tries to agree with the other processes on the delivery of the messages in the set (lines 7-14). The task starts by constructing a vector H i with a hash of each of the messages in R delivered i (line 8). A hash works essentially as a fixed-length unique identifier of the message. The objective is to compress the input supplied to the vector consensus protocol, since the performance of this protocol depends on the size of the value (e.g., the communication time depends on the size of the messages). A hash is obtained using a hash function h defined by the following properties [22] :
• HF1 Compression: h maps an input x of arbitrary finite length, to an output h(x) of fixed length.
• HF2 One way: for all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find an input that hashes to that output.
• HF3 Weak collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any second input that has the same output as a specified input 3 .
• HF4 Strong collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find two different inputs that hash to the same output.
The value proposed by a process to the vector consensus is itself a vector with the hashes of the messages, H i (lines 8-9). The vector consensus protocol decides on a vector X i with at least (2f + 1) vectors H from different processes. If the hash of a message appears in at least (f + 1) of these vectors, the process can be confident that the hash was proposed by at least one correct process (there are at most f corrupt processes), therefore there is no doubt that the message was reliably broadcasted to all processes. This is important because a malicious process might provide a hash for which there was no message to deliver. The process waits until all messages that are to be delivered are put in R delivered i (line 10), then it stores them in A deliver i (line 10). Finally, the process delivers the messages in A deliver i in a pre-established order, removes them from R delivered i , and increments the atomic broadcast identifier (lines 12-14).
Correctness Proof
The atomic broadcast protocol in Algorithm 3 is correct if it satisfies the properties AB1, AB2, AB3 and AB4.
Theorem 9 (Validity) If a correct process broadcasts a message M, then some correct process eventually delivers M.
Proof: A correct process broadcasts a message M by calling A Broadcast(m). Then, the atomic broadcast protocol adds a header to the message and broadcasts it using the reliable broadcast protocol (line 5). The 
The protocol can be optimized by replacing the second reliable broadcast in line 10 by a (normal) broadcast or by the transmission of the VECT message individually to all processes. In this case, one correct process might receive (n − 2f ) messages with the value to be decided v, while another correct process would not. To circumvent this problem, all correct processes that receive (n − 2f ) messages with the value v (line 11) must resend these messages to all other processes. This optimization reduces the 3 rounds of the reliable broadcast protocol to 2 rounds.
The vector consensus protocol runs in the best case in one round, in the worst in n − (2f + 1) + 1 rounds (e.g., if n = 4, f = 1, the protocol terminates in one or two rounds). In the best case the loop in lines 3-8 will be executed only once so the time complexity will be the sum of those of the reliable broadcast (line 2) and the multi-valued consensus (line 6). If the protocol does not terminate in the end of the first round, it is reasonable to expect that all VC INIT messages reliably broadcasted will be delivered during the first execution of M V Consensus, since this consensus involves several rounds of message exchange (two reliable broadcasts plus one binary consensus). This would make the protocol terminate in the second round.
However, a collusion of malicious protocols could try to delay the protocol a maximum of f rounds. Therefore, the time complexity of the algorithm is O(f ).
The time complexity of the atomic broadcast protocol depends on the amount of messages being transmitted. If only occasional messages are sent, the time complexity is equivalent to one reliable broadcast (line 5) plus one vector consensus (line 9), therefore the expected number of rounds is O(f ). However, if messages go on arriving during an execution of the vector consensus protocol, in the next round task T1 will try to make agreement on several messages instead of only one. Therefore this protocol exhibits the virtuous characteristic that its number of rounds declines considerably if the rate of transmissions increases. Table 1 summarizes the results for all protocols.
Related Work
The FLP impossibility result implies that any consensus protocol in a strictly asynchronous environment has to be randomized. Most randomized consensus protocols presented in the literature are binary. An exception is the multi-valued crash-tolerant protocol in [15] . Turpin and Coan presented a transformation from binary to multi-valued consensus for synchronous systems [31] . Toueg presented a transformation for asynchronous systems [30] . The main difference of this transformation to Algorithm 1 is that Toueg uses signatures, therefore it does not require a reliable broadcast primitive but a weaker echo broadcast protocol. His protocol has optimal resilience and has time complexity O(1), but needs asymmetric cryptography. Cachin et al. proposed a similar transformation, but the algorithm is based on voting the selection of the value proposed by each successive process [6] . The protocol has optimal resilience but uses signatures and has a time complexity of O(nf 2 ), therefore it scales much worse than ours that has time complexity O(1).
Interactive consistency was defined as the problem of agreeing on a vector with one value per correct process [25] . However, in asynchronous systems it is not possible to differentiate slow from crashed processes, and with a Byzantine fault model it might also be impossible to distinguish malicious from crashed processes.
Therefore, for Byzantine asynchronous systems the vector consensus problem was defined [13] . Two vector consensus protocols based on failure detectors have been specified in the meantime [13, 1] . Recently, Ben-Or and El-Yaniv presented a randomized vector consensus protocol with optimal resilience, time complexity O (1) and no signatures [3] . However, the message complexity is considerably higher than ours, since the protocol runs n multi-valued consensus protocols in parallel, while ours runs at most n − (2f + 1) + 1 multi-valued consensuses.
For the crash fault model, some transformations from multi-valued consensus to atomic broadcast have been defined [19, 10, 18] . Cachin et al. defined a transformation from multi-valued consensus to atomic broadcast for Byzantine faults, but they use cryptographic signatures [6] . Doudou et al. presented a transformation closer to ours [12] . It does not use signatures but it has higher communication complexity since it gives the full messages to the consensus module, instead of just small hashes.
To the best of our knowledge, no transformation from vector consensus to atomic broadcast is available in the literature. A collection of randomized atomic broadcast protocols can be found in [23] . These protocols rely on signatures to guarantee the authenticity of the messages and do not have optimal resilience. Other Byzantineresistant atomic broadcasts for asynchronous systems can be found in Rampart [28] that uses signatures and SecureRing [20] that uses a signed token. BFT [9] does not use signatures when there are no faults, therefore it is very efficient. Unlike ours, all these three protocols need a failure detector to put away corrupt processes.
Apart from the added complexity, the design of Byzantine failure detectors that are complete is still an open research issue.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a hierarchy of intrusion-tolerant or Byzantine-resistant protocols. These protocols form a coherent family, sharing effective and efficient structural properties: signature freedom, full asynchrony, distribution and optimal resilience.
The hierarchy shows a series of protocol transformations: from binary consensus to multi-valued consensus; from multi-valued consensus to vector consensus; from vector consensus to atomic broadcast. The objective is to provide a modular set of protocols that a designer can use in practice in the construction of intrusion-tolerant systems, especially in systems with limited resources like embedded or ubiquitous environments. Therefore, the protocols evade a set of characteristics that might constitute a shortcoming in a real system: the use of public-key cryptography, a known performance bottleneck in intrusion-tolerant systems; time assumptions, often vulnerable to some attacks; the existence of leaders or other 'privileged' processes, whose failure might be costly to detect.
The multi-valued consensus protocol terminates in a constant expected number of rounds. However, due to the severe nature of malicious faults, vector consensus is more effective as a system building block for securityrelated applications. The time complexity of the vector consensus proposed is O(f ). The time complexity of the atomic broadcast protocol is also O(f ), although the number of rounds can be considerably lower if there are several messages being transmitted. These results look extremely promising. In fact, they are at least as good as previous works. We plan to run detailed evaluations of the protocol hierarchy and present the results in a future paper.
